US-China: Reluctant Interdependence

Research evidence excerpt

US-China: Reluctant Interdependence

Macquarie

and an explicit demand for recognition of spheres of interest: smaller Global Strategy. Expressed in current USD market

prices

nations only have as much sovereignty as larger nations are willing to

concede. 3. Although Western alliance remains dominant on most metrics US Polarization Index

(e.g. GDP, R&D, patents), its stability has been fractured and is unlikely to

be restored for years to come. While cracks were becoming evident for 2.5 US Polarization Index

more than a decade, Trump 2.0 and populist waves that swept across 2.0

democracies meaningfully weakened these bonds. Whereas in the past, it 1.5

would have been assumed that alliance members would follow US lead, this 1.0

is no longer the case. As a result, US has lost considerable economic and 0.5

geopolitical clout. 4. Apart from technology and USD, the only US products 0.0

of value to China are commodities (e.g. soybeans, gas, meat) and Boeing -0.5

aircraft. While no specific announcements were made, it is likely that China -1.0

will agree to significantly boost purchases. On the other hand, we don't -1.5

place much value on vague promises of opening up China's economy. 5. -2.0

1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 2022 2025China's vulnerabilities are domestic. Given its inability to lower savings, it

is dependent on investment and exports to drive the economy. Hence, Source: V-Dem; Macquarie Global Strategy

China must maintain access to foreign markets either directly (e.g. EU,

ASEAN, India) or indirectly (e.g. US). The idea that China could easily switch

drivers (i.e consumption) is too optimistic. 6. The summit reinforced Mark