European Technology "European Technological Sovereignty Package" Briest

Research evidence excerpt

European Technology "European Technological Sovereignty Package" Briest

ions of excellence and reducing the risk of supply

disruptions, coercive pressure and systemic shocks in key sectors. It aims to reduce

"overdependence on third countries for semiconductor design and manufacturing [and]

insufficient crisis preparedness capabilities". In our view, the pivot towards demand-side

support suggests a more indirect approach to aiding the semiconductor industry

compared to the first iteration. Nonetheless, the policy continues to provide overall

support for the European semiconductor sector by potentially stimulating demand in the

short to medium term, thereby contributing to the development of a more

"independent" market.

The Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA)

CADA (link) notes the market share of EU providers in EU cloud services fell from 29% in

2017 to 15% in 2022 and has since stagnated. It has an ambition to triple data centre

capacity in the next 5-7 years and establish a "single EU-wide sovereignty framework".

Public procurement for cloud services should consider the level of European added value

in tenders and aspire to award at least 25% of procurement to SMEs. While

announcements on decisions related to the rollout of a range of AI gigafactories in

Europe with up to €20bn in supported funding had initially been expected before the

end of 2025 (link), this is now expected to commence in July with Bloomberg suggesting

weakening enthusiasm for participation in the programme by commercial organisations

given uncertainty around the timing that financing would be available and the

predictability of demand (link).

Implications for the sector

We wrote previously on the positioning of our coverage for sovereign cloud initiatives in

Europe (link).